The name of the Iraqi Police station is translated from the Arabic as “white gold.” Years ago the adjacent street market dealt almost exclusively with dairy products that, in this inhospitable environment, were scarce and sold for high prices. Then it was probably clean, safe, and prosperous. Today, like much of the west Baghdad Abu Ghraib district in which it lies, the neighborhood is rundown, trashy, and dangerous.

Captain Bryon Greene, 716th MP Company.

But it is, insists Army Captain Bryon Greene, improving. Greene is a dark haired, dark eyed, late 20s officer, leader of the Police Transition Team that the 716th MP Company, 18th MP Brigade, targets to work the “Abu G” district. With his olive complexion dressed in proper garb, Greene could almost pass for one of the Iraqis he advises. When we arrive he instantly learns that the police chief is out and expected back shortly, but – good news – the mayor is available immediately. So we walk to the adjacent concrete block building.

Within minutes we are sitting in the small office of the local mayor, a tall, good looking man in his mid-forties. He is introduced as Mayor Shaker, and takes time to speak with the two of us through Captain Greene’s interpreter. Outside Shaker’s office a handful of local sheiks and other citizens sit, patiently fingering prayer beads or chain-smoking cigarettes, waiting for the opportunity to wheedle the mayor about some special favor or complaint.

Gesturing toward the door, the mayor affirms, that “six months ago none of these people would have come to my office. It would have been too dangerous for them to be seen as supporting the Iraqi government. The al Qaeda terrorists would have killed them. And if they were desperate enough to seek any assistance at all, they would have looked to the Iraqi Army (IA) for help before a civil official. This is a very positive development.”

Baghdad Abu Ghraib district Mayor Shaker described the shifting - and slowly improving - relationships between Iraqi citizens, government, the National Police, and military forces.

Under Saddam, Mayor Shaker explains, the IA was the universal arbitrator. If citizens had problems they visited the local army officer, paid him a bribe sufficient in amount to cover the solution they wanted, and then hoped for the best. There were no guarantees. IA officials might gleefully accept money from both sides and do nothing. If that happened, as it frequently did, then the complainant had no choice but to accept matters as they were or offer more money. It was a corrupt, destructive system, Shaker says, and helps explain why ordinary Iraqi citizens are cynical and skeptical about the army and police now.

On the other hand, the Iraqi people have no choice: the situation must change. “We must transition from military to civil authority if we are ever going to develop,” Shaker says. “In time the people must realize that they need to go to the civil police force – the Iraqi Police – and not the military to solve problems.” Is that happening now at all? “We are seeing the beginning.” Shaker gestures to his waiting room. “Local sheiks and tribal leaders are coming here or next door to the IP station to report problems rather than seek out local army units. That is progress.”

So where is the hang-up? “The IA are contemptuous of and distrust the IPs,” Shaker tells us. Privately Greene adds his observations. “We can’t do anything about the IA, but we can and are working on improving both the reputation and capability of the IPs. That is a major part of our focus.” The implication is clear: with added professionalism the IPs will become the symbol of the new Iraq. And the army can go back to its traditional mission of safeguarding the country from outside threat.

Iraqi National Police march during their graduation ceremony, May 2008.

The mayor likes to use the US Army as a model for what he sees an ideal role of the IA. “The country needs to get to the point where the army can be comfortable moving out of the cities. The American Army is here now but is always talking about finishing the job and moving on.” The mayor worries that the IA on the other hand, might be getting “too comfortable” with its role in the city. “If we are ever going to develop the civil society we all want, the rule of law,” the mayor says, “then the army has to leave.”

Meanwhile, he is the first to acknowledge that “We need to have lines of communication open right now between the IA and society.” He points to some of the sheiks waiting outside his office. “Many IA officers will see those men as enemies. At one point, after Saddam fell, they may have been sympathetic to al Qaeda. But that time has long passed and these sheiks are openly expressing support for the government. If the IA arrests them and throws them in jail it risks driving them away from the government again. That is why I say that the IA is getting involved in more than its job to fight terror.”

Because of all these factors and more, the mayor is a vocal supporter of IP expansion and professional training. He is a major backer for Greene’s PTT mission. One of the points of frustration has been slow issuance of “badges” for the IPs. In their context, badges are not the metallic emblems worn on the uniform shirt, but are identification cards issued by the Ministry of the Interior, supervisory agency for the IPs. The ID card is an official announcement that the bearer is a member of the IP corps, and even more importantly, has a notation on the bottom that the IP member is authorized to carry a weapon.

A Glock pistol is awarded to each IP upon graduation from training. This pistol is a huge point of pride with them. A constant source of frustration and friction occurs when over-zealous or arrogant IA soldiers manning checkpoints refuse to accept the IPs identification and confiscate their pistols. This has happened to the point of exasperation among many of the ranking IP leaders.

Back in the station itself CPT Greene weighs in with newly arrived Major Bossim, station commander. The major and Greene clearly are comfortable in each other’s company. Bossim almost immediately raises the question of badges and Greene responds with information that he knows that senior US officials are raising a uniform ID card standard to their MOI partners in hope of a quick decision. Bossim smiles and nods, but both he and Greene realize that Iraq is not the land or culture of quick decisions.

He can only hope that his IPs continue to navigate through Army checkpoints safely and without undue harassment until the coveted badges finally arrive.